US healthcare · HIPAA Security Rule
HIPAA and end-of-life software
The HIPAA Security Rule does not name end-of-life software or set a patching deadline. It requires a covered entity or business associate to assess the risks and vulnerabilities to electronic protected health information (ePHI) and to manage them to a reasonable and appropriate level, so an unsupported component becomes a documented risk with a plan, not an automatic violation. HHS proposed in January 2025 to add patch deadlines of 15 days for critical risks and 30 days for high risks; as of 15 November 2026 that proposal is not a final rule.
Published . Clause text checked 15 November 2026against the sources listed at the foot of the page. OSSeva's evidence supports your own assessment; it does not make you compliant.
Security Rule
HIPAA Security Rule provisions that touch end-of-life software
The current Security Rule is technology-neutral. Section 164.306(b) lets a regulated entity choose any security measures that let it implement the standards reasonably and appropriately, taking account of its size, its technical infrastructure, the cost of measures and the probability and criticality of the risks to ePHI. That flexibility is why the rule says nothing about software lifecycles. These provisions are where an end-of-life component lands.
| Provision | What it asks | Why end of life puts it in play |
|---|---|---|
| 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) Risk analysis (Required) | "Conduct an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities" to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of ePHI. | A component whose project has stopped issuing fixes is a known vulnerability source. It has to appear in the analysis with its end-of-life date. |
| 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) Risk management (Required) | "Implement security measures sufficient to reduce risks and vulnerabilities to a reasonable and appropriate level." | The measure can be replacement, a patched build from another source, isolation, or a documented acceptance. The rule leaves the choice to you, with the reasoning written down. |
| 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Protection from malicious software (Addressable) | "Procedures for guarding against, detecting, and reporting malicious software." | Unpatched software is the usual way malicious software gets in. Addressable means you implement it, implement an equivalent, or document why neither is reasonable. |
| 164.308(a)(8) Evaluation | "Perform a periodic technical and nontechnical evaluation" of whether your security policies and procedures still meet the rule. | An end-of-life notice, a new advisory or a changed environment is the kind of event that triggers a fresh look. |
| 164.312(c)(1) Integrity and 164.312(b) Audit controls | Protect ePHI from improper alteration or destruction; record and examine activity in systems that contain or use ePHI. | A vulnerable database, broker or runtime that stores or moves ePHI puts both at risk, so the controls above have to cover it. |
Quoted text is from the eCFR version of 45 CFR Part 164 current on 10 November 2026. Which implementation specifications apply to you, and how, is a decision for your risk analysis and your counsel.
For the technical safeguards in more depth, see HIPAA technical safeguards and open source software.
Proposed rule
The 2025 proposal: patch deadlines and an asset inventory
On 6 January 2025 HHS published a notice of proposed rulemaking, "HIPAA Security Rule To Strengthen the Cybersecurity of Electronic Protected Health Information" (90 FR 898), with comments due on 7 March 2025. It would make several changes that bear on end-of-life software. It is a proposal: a Federal Register search on 15 November 2026 found no final amendment, so the current Security Rule above is what applies today.
| Proposed change | What it says | Where an end-of-life component fits |
|---|---|---|
| Technology asset inventory and network map (proposed 164.308(a)(1)(i)) | A written, accurate inventory of the technology assets that may affect ePHI, and a network map. | The inventory is where a component's version and end-of-life date would be recorded. |
| Patch timeframes (proposed 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C)) | Patch, update or upgrade within 15 calendar days of identifying a critical risk and within 30 calendar days for a high risk, where a patch is available; or, where none is available, within that period of one becoming available. | On an ended line the project releases nothing, so the clock has nothing to start on unless a supplier ships a patched build. |
| Documented exceptions (proposed 164.308(a)(4)(ii)(D)) | An exception applies only if documented and its conditions are met. One listed condition is that no patch, update or upgrade is available for the risk. | The proposal expects the exception and its reasoning to be on file, not assumed. |
| Compensating controls (preamble) | Where patches are not available, such as obsolete or unsupported software, the preamble says regulated entities should implement reasonable compensating controls, for example restricting network access or disabling network services. | This is guidance in the proposal's explanation, not rule text. |
Read the proposal itself before relying on any of this: final text may differ, and a final rule would set its own compliance dates. Source: Federal Register document 2024-30983.
Evidence
Evidence that supports a risk analysis
HIPAA has no certification for a software build, so nothing OSSeva ships makes you compliant. What a patched build gives your risk analysis is a record of what was fixed and when. The same evidence is listed on the PCI DSS and FedRAMP and CMMC guides, and the compliance matrix sets it against every framework. Compliance documentation is part of OSSeva Assure and is delivered under NDA.
| Item | What it records | Supports |
|---|---|---|
| CVE record and attestation letter | CVE id, CVSS, affected versions, patch delivery date and build identifier for each release. | Risk analysis (what was known) and risk management (what was done and when) |
| VEX statement per CVE | Whether the CVE is fixed in this build or does not affect it, with the reason. | Risk analysis: separating real exposure from scanner noise |
| Patched build | The build with its release date, signed with GPG or cosign and a SHA-256 checksum. Patches apply to upstream source, with no fork. | Risk management: the measure you installed |
| SBOM | The components in the patched build, in CycloneDX or SPDX. | Your asset inventory and the question of which systems an announced flaw touches |
| Assure documentation | Evidence matrices and remediation records for the frameworks your auditors use. | Your risk analysis file |
Verify the signatures with the steps on the security page. The install date, the risk ranking and the decision are yours: the evidence shows what was patched and when, and your risk analysis shows what you did with it.
Options
Four ways to answer an end-of-life component in a risk analysis
The Security Rule leaves the choice of measure to you. These are the four an assessor or OCR investigator sees most, with what has to be written down for each.
| Option | What it means | Record to keep |
|---|---|---|
| Replace or upgrade | Move to a supported version. It ends the question, and often takes the longest. | The plan, owner and date in the risk management plan. |
| Patched build from another source | Keep the version you run and install fixes from a supplier. Extended support is this option. | The CVE record, VEX statements and install dates for each patch. |
| Reduce exposure | Restrict network access to the component or disable services it does not need, as the 2025 proposal's preamble suggests. | The network design and the reasoning that the remaining exposure is reasonable and appropriate. |
| Accept the risk, documented | Keep running it and record why, with a review date. | The analysis, the decision, who made it and when it will be revisited. |
Service levels
Service levels
Critical CVEs are patched within 48 hours and High within 7 days, for every technology OSSeva supports. OSSeva Operate adds 24/7 coverage with a 15-minute P1 response, a 1-hour P2 and a 4-hour P3. OSSeva Assure includes 24/7 reactive support and the compliance documentation above. The SLA page has the terms.
Not a fit for
- You want a HIPAA assessment or certification. OSSeva is not an assessor, does not certify that you comply with HIPAA and does not file anything with HHS for you.
- You need a statement about ePHI handling or business associate arrangements. This guide covers patched open source builds and the evidence they produce, and makes no claim about either.
- The component is closed source. OSSeva patches open source lines; check yours on the supported versions page.
- You cannot install a patched build inside your own change window. The evidence shows what was patched and when; the install date is yours.
Does HIPAA allow end-of-life software?
The Security Rule does not ban it by name. It requires a risk analysis (164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A)) and risk management measures sufficient to reduce risks to a reasonable and appropriate level (164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B)). An end-of-life component has to appear in the analysis, with a documented plan or a documented reason for keeping it.
Is there a HIPAA patching deadline?
Not in the current Security Rule. HHS proposed 15 calendar days for critical risks and 30 for high risks in a notice published on 6 January 2025 (90 FR 898). As of 15 November 2026 a Federal Register search found no final rule, so the proposed deadlines are not in force.
Is protection from malicious software required?
It is an addressable implementation specification under 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B). Addressable does not mean optional: you implement it, implement an equivalent measure, or document why neither is reasonable and appropriate.
What if the vendor no longer releases patches?
The current rule leaves the measure to your risk analysis: replace the component, install patches from another source, reduce its exposure, or accept and document the risk. The 2025 proposal's preamble says regulated entities should implement reasonable compensating controls where patches are not available.
Does OSSeva make me HIPAA compliant?
No. OSSeva supplies patched open source builds and the evidence that records what was fixed and when. HIPAA compliance is yours, and your risk analysis decides what that evidence proves.
Sources
Checked 15 November 2026. Clause numbers and wording are from the official texts below. OSSeva does not certify that you comply with any of these rules, does not act as an assessor and does not file reports for you.
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Ask what the evidence for a patched build contains: the SBOM, VEX statements, signed build and CVE record. Your risk analysis decides what it proves.